
Inverse Optimal Power Flow: Assessing the Vulnerability of Power Grid Data Priya L. Donti,^{*,1,2} Inês Lima Azevedo,² and J. Zico Kolter¹ ¹ School of Computer Science ² Dept. of Engineering & Public Policy (Carnegie Mellon) pdonti@cmu.edu

We propose **inverse optimal power flow**, an algorithm to assess the extent to which private power grid data is compromised by public data. This algorithm inverts the AC optimal power flow optimization problem used to schedule electricity. Using this algorithm, we are able to learn private information such as electricity generation costs and (to some extent) grid structural parameters on a 14-bus test case.

Introduction

In the electricity sector, there is a great need to protect critical information that could compromise fair electricity market operation or power grid cybersecurity. At the same time, grid operators and governmental entities regularly publish grid data that could potentially expose this critical information.

Generator bidding curve



Inverse optimal power flow algorithm

We assess the extent to which private grid data is exposed by public grid data by inverting ACOPF. Previous work has approached similar problems using techniques from game theory, graph theory, and bi-level optimization [1]. We formulate inverse optimal power flow (inverse OPF) as an optimization problem and solve it via gradient descent-based methods within a neural network.

Main challenge: Computing $\nabla_{\theta} \ell\left(\left(p_g, \lambda\right), \left(\hat{p}_g, \hat{\lambda}\right)\right)$ for each $\theta \in \left\{\hat{c}, \hat{Y}\right\}$ (required for computing ℓ_{pub}). This involves gradients through the ACOPF solution since:


$$\frac{\delta\ell}{\delta\theta} = \frac{\delta\ell}{\delta\hat{p}_g}\frac{\delta\hat{p}_g}{\delta\theta} + \frac{\delta\ell}{\delta\hat{\lambda}}\frac{\delta\hat{\lambda}}{\delta\theta}.$$

To compute these gradients, we first solve ACOPF via sequential quadratic programming [2]. That is, we:

input: $\{(p_g^{(u)}, \lambda^{(u)}) | i = 1, ..., m\}$ // public data initialize: \hat{c}, \hat{Y} // some initial guess for t = 1, ..., T: compute $\ell_{\text{pub}} = \sum_{i=1}^{l} \ell\left(\left(p_g^{(i)}, \lambda^{(i)}\right), \left(\hat{p}_g^{(i)}, \hat{\lambda}^{(i)}\right)\right)$ // update guesses if loss has not converged if $\ell_{\text{pub}} \neq 0$ then update \hat{c} with $\nabla_{\hat{c}} \ell_{\text{pub}}$ update \hat{Y} with $\nabla_{\hat{Y}} \ell_{\text{pub}}$ else return \widehat{c}, \widehat{Y} end if end for

- assume $f_c(p_g) = p_g^T \text{diag}(c_q)p_g + c_a^T p_g$ for quadratic and affine costs c_q, c_a ,
- linearize the power flow constraint as $J(z_0)z = k(z_0)$ at some guess z_0 , and then solve the resultant QP iteratively (updating z_0) until the solution converges.


At the optimum, we implicitly differentiate the KKT conditions of the ACOPF QP relaxation, which yields a linear equation we can solve to efficiently get gradients [3]:



 $\operatorname{Re}(y_{i,i})$

Preliminary results (14-bus system)

Preliminary experiments on a 14-bus system suggest that we are able to learn all cost parameters in *c* and some structural parameters in *Y*.



used. Our estimate for $Y_{12,13}$ converges, but our estimate for $Y_{1,4}$ diverges.

 $Im(y_{i,j})$

[1] Yuan, Y. et al. (2016). On the Inverse Power Flow Problem. *arXiv preprint arXiv: 1610.06631.*

[2] Boggs, P. & Tolle, J. (1995). Sequential Quadratic Programming. Acta Numerica 4:1-51.

[3] Amos, B. & Kolter, J.Z. (2017). OptNet: Differentiable Optimization as a Layer in Neural Networks. Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning, in PMLR 70:136-145.

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